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Abstract— The security-constrained economic dispatch
(SCED) problem tries to maintain the reliability of a power
network by ensuring that a single failure does not lead to a
global outage. The previous research has mainly investigated
SCED by formulating the problem in different modalities,
e.g. preventive or corrective, and devising efficient solutions
for SCED. In this paper, we tackle a novel and important
direction, and analyze the economic cost of incorporating
security constraints in economic dispatch. Inspired by existing
inefficiency metrics in game theory and computer science, we
introduce notion of price of security as a metric that formally
characterizes the economic inefficiency of security-constrained
economic dispatch as compared to the original problem
without security constraints. Then, we focus on the preventive
approach in a simple topology comprising two buses and two
lines, and investigate the impact of generation availability and
demand distribution on the price of security. Moreover, we
explicitly derive the worst-case input instance that leads to the
maximum price of security. By extensive experimental study
on two test-cases, we verify the analytical results and provide
insights for characterizing the price of security in general
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goals in power system operation are to
minimize operating costs and maintain system reliability [1].
The economic dispatch (ED) problem minimizes generation
costs subject to operating constraints [2], [3]. To ensure that
failures do not cascade after major disturbances, such as
line or generator outages, system operators add security con-
straints to the economic dispatch problem [4]. The resulting
problem is known as security-constrained economic dispatch
(SCED) [5]–[9]. The typical criteria is that the system must
be robust to the failure of any single element, i.e. the solution
must satisfy the N − 1 condition [10].
There are currently two major approaches to SCED. Pre-
ventive approaches impose additional operating limits for the
post-disturbance configurations, resulting from contingen-
cies, without taking into account the corrective capabilities
of the system [9]. In contrast, corrective approaches leverage
the system’s real-time corrective capabilities after an outage,
such as generation rescheduling, switching, congestion man-
agement, etc. [11]. Therefore, while preventive approaches
are simpler to implement than corrective approaches, the
former are overly conservative and more expensive. Nev-
ertheless, majority of SCED implementations today are
preventive. Historically, this may be due, in part, to more
complex control, sensing, and communication requirements
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of real-time corrective dispatch. However, recent research
has demonstrated that it is possible to efficiently dispatch
generators in real-time and distributed manners to rapidly
correct for grid disturbances [3], [12], [13].
With the growth of renewables and distributed generation,
existing approaches for ensuring system security may not be
appropriate for the future grid. The inefficiency of preventive
approaches could become more significant due to increased
operating uncertainty and greater number of active generation
sources. The future grid is also more likely to have multiple
correlated failures, which necessitates additional contingency
considerations beyond N − 1 [14], leading to even more
conservative scheduling and higher costs. Therefore, it is
increasingly important to understand the tradeoffs between
different approaches for ensuring security. Specifically, there
is a need to understand the impact of security constraints
on operating costs and their tradeoffs against the benefits of
system reliability.
To date, we are not aware of any analysis of the operating
costs attributable to security constraints. While there is a
large body of literature on SCED, majority of the research
have focused on developing efficient algorithms for solving
the problem [6], [8]–[10], [15], [16]. This is motivated by
the fact that the size of the problem increases significantly
when security constraints are added to the economic dispatch
problem. Understanding the additional costs incurred due to
security constraints, as well as how the costs depend on
system structure (e.g. network topology, demand profiles,
generation availability, etc.), may also provide insights into
the most critical components in the system, and in turn guide
resource allocation, maintenance decisions, and infrastruc-
ture investments.
In this paper, we study the impact of security constraints
on operating costs. We focus on preventive approaches as it is
the most prevalent approach for ensuring security in current
power systems. In particular, we study the cost of ensuring
N − 1 security by investigating the ratio of dispatch costs
at the solution of SCED to that at the solution of ED (i.e.
removing security constraints from SCED). We refer to this
ratio as the price of security. We completely characterize the
price of security for a simple topology comprising two buses
and two lines.
Our analyses illustrates a few phenomena. First, the price
of security always increases when there is more cheap
generation capacity in the system. Second, the price of
security is maximized when the lines between the two buses
are saturated. This could be expected since the most cheap
generation is substituted for expensive generation (to ensure
security) when the lines are most heavily utilized. However,
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our analyses also reveals a counter-intuitive phenomenon.
Given fixed total demand, having more demand distributed
on the cheaper node may in fact increase the price of security.
This occurs when the transmission line is fully utilized, and
so additional demand does not change the cost of ensuring
security; but when more demand is distributed on the cheaper
node, the optimum economic dispatch cost is smaller, and
therefore the cost of security has a relatively bigger impact
on the dispatch cost.
Finally, we investigate numerically the price of security
for the PJM 5-bus system [17] and illustrate that some
of our theoretical results in the 2-bus case manifest in
more general settings. In particular, the numerical results on
the PJM 5-bus system show that the impact of generation
capacity and demand distribution at the cheap region of the
network is similar to that of the 2-bus system. However,
finding the worst-case demand that maximizes the price of
security is a formidable task that depends on properties of the
lines between two regions, aggregate demand, and demand
distribution.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the power system model used
throughout this paper and define the economic dispatch and
security-constrained economic dispatch problems. Then we
define the proposed metric for measuring the inefficiency of
security-constrained economic dispatch.
A. Power System
We model the topology of the power network by a directed
graph1 G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes (buses, used
interchangeably), indexed by v, and E is the set of edges
(lines or branches, used interchangeably), indexed by e. Let
n := |V| and m := |E| denote the number of nodes and
edges respectively.
We assume that each node v has exactly one generator
and one load.2 Assume that the generator at node v has a
maximum generation capacity qv ∈ R+, and it incurs a cost
αvqv when generating qv , where the coefficient αv ∈ R+.
Let dv denote the demand at node v. Define the vectors
q := (qv, v ∈ V), q := (qv, v ∈ V), and α := (αv, v ∈ V).
Let fe denote the power flow on edge e and assume that
the edge has a thermal line limit (capacity) fe. Define the
vectors f := (fe, e ∈ E) and f := (fe, e ∈ E). We assume a
DC power flow model and let H be the m × n matrix of
shift factors that map power injections to line flows. Then
the latter are given by
f = H(q− d). (1)
1Note that in reality the power flow on the links are bidirectional, however,
it is a common practice to model the network topology as a directed graph
with arbitrary directions on the edges.
2Considering linear cost model for generators, this assumption is not
restrictive multiple generators (resp. loads) at a node can be equivalently
represented by a single generator (resp. load) via an appropriate transfor-
mation of costs (resp. demands).
B. Economic Dispatch
The economic dispatch problem minimizes generation
costs subject to operating constraints and is given by:
ED : min
q
αTq (2a)
s.t. 0 ≤ q ≤ q, (2b)
1T(q− d) = 0, (2c)
−f ≤ H(q− d) ≤ f . (2d)
Constraint (2b) restricts generations to capacities, con-
straint (2c) enforces supply-demand balance, and con-
straint (2d) restricts line flows to line limits.
C. Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
Next, we formulate the security-constrained economic
dispatch problem. In this paper, we focus on robustness to
the outage of any single line. Associate with the outage of
an edge e ∈ E the m− 1 vector f−e = (fe′ : e′ ∈ E , e′ 6= e)
of line capacities and the (m − 1) × n matrix H−e of
shift factors. We are interested in the following security-
constrained economic dispatch problem:
SCED : min
q
αTq (3a)
s.t. 0 ≤ q ≤ q, (3b)
1T(q− d) = 0, (3c)
−f ≤ H(q− d) ≤ f , (3d)
−f−e ≤ H−e(q− d) ≤ f−e,∀e. (3e)
Note that SCED contains 2m(m − 1) more constraints
than ED, which are represented by (3e), each of which is
associated with a unique line outage.
D. Price of Security
Our goal is to understand the cost of ensuring security
to outage of any single line. To that end, we define a
metric to compare the operating costs of the solutions to
ED and SCED. Our metric has an intuitive interpretation
and is motivated by inefficiency metrics in game theory and
computer science (e.g. price of anarchy, price of stability,
competitive ratio) [18], [19].
Given a network G, cost coefficients (αv, v ∈ V), and
transmission line limits (fe, e ∈ E), let ω = (q,d) ∈ Ω be
an input instance to ED and SCED, where Ω is the set of
all possible different instances of generation capacities and
demands that are feasible to both problems. Define c?ed(ω)
and c?sc(ω) as the optimal values of ED and SCED under
input instance ω, respectively.
Definition 1: We define the price of security for input
instance ω by:
PoS(ω) :=
c?sc(ω)
c?ed(ω)
. (4)
Note that all feasible solutions of SCED are also feasible
for ED, hence, it follows that c?ed(ω) ≤ c?sc(ω), and hence,
PoS(ω) ≥ 1. We are interested in characterizing the instance
that lead to the largest value for PoS(ω), that is, the
maximum extra cost of ensuring security.
e1
e2
v1 v2
Fig. 1. A simple 2-bus topology
Since it is typically difficult to obtain closed form ex-
pressions for the solutions to ED and SCED (as a function
of ω), obtaining a closed form expression for PoS(ω) is
a challenging task in general. Moreover, system operators
typically do not have direct control on demand, and gen-
eration availability varied over time. Thus, it is of interest
to characterize the worst-case generation availability and
demand profile that maximizes the price of security.
Definition 2: We define the worst-case price of security
over all instances in Ω by:
PoS := sup
ω∈Ω
PoS(ω). (5)
Note that we define the worst-case price of security over
different generation capacities and demands only, assuming
fixed network topology, cost functions, and line limits. This is
motivated by the fact that the latter are typically constant over
longer time-scales (i.e. days or months) while generation
availabilities and demands vary greatly over shorter time-
scales (i.e. hours). Moreover, as we will demonstrate in
this paper, generation capacities and demands alone have
complicated and surprising impacts on the price of security.
Therefore, we focus on analyzing the worst-case price of
security over generation capacities and demands, and leave
the analyses with respect to other factors to future work.
To obtain insights into the problem, we begin by analyzing
a simple 2-bus topology in the next section. Our analyses
provide insights into the major determinants of the costs of
security. Then, in the subsequent section, we investigate these
insights numerically on the 2-bus topology as well as the
PJM 5-bus system [17]
III. ANALYSIS OF 2-BUS TOPOLOGY
In this section, we analyze the price of security of the
simple 2-bus topology shown in Fig. 1, where there are 2
nodes connected by 2 edges. Therefore, V = {v1, v2} and
E = {e1, e2}. Our results provide insights into behavior in
more general topologies. All proofs are given in Appendix.
First, we simplify ED. By specializing ED to the 2-bus
topology, we obtain the following problem:
ED-2b :
min
q1,q2
α1q1 + α2q2
s.t. 0 ≤ q1 ≤ q1, (6a)
0 ≤ q2 ≤ q2, (6b)
(q1 − d1) + (q2 − d2) = 0, (6c)
−f1 ≤
B1(q1 − d1 − q2 + d2)
2(B1 +B2)
≤ f1, (6d)
−f2 ≤
B2(q1 − d1 − q2 + d2)
2(B1 +B2)
≤ f2, (6e)
where constraints (6a) and (6b) are equivalent to the gen-
eration capacity constraint (2b) in ED, constraint (6c) is
the supply-demand balance constraint, and constraints (6d)
and (6e) are the line constraints associated with lines e1 and
e2, respectively. By substituting equation (6c) into inequal-
ities (6d) and (6e), the latter two inequalities are equivalent
to the following single constraint:
− fed ≤ q1 − d1 ≤ fed, (7)
where
fed := (B1 +B2) min
{
f1
B1
,
f2
B2
}
. (8)
Note that fed can be interpreted as the maximum flow from
node 1 to node 2.
Next, we simplify SCED. By specializing SCED to the
2-bus topology, and making use of the simplification in (7),
we obtain the following problem:
SCED-2b :
min
q1,q2
α1q1 + α2q2
s.t. 0 ≤ q1 ≤ q1, (9a)
0 ≤ q2 ≤ q2, (9b)
(q1 − d1) + (q2 − d2) = 0, (9c)
−fed ≤ q1 − d1 ≤ fed, (9d)
−f1 ≤ 1/2(q1 − d1 − q2 + d2) ≤ f1, (9e)
−f2 ≤ 1/2(q1 − d1 − q2 + d2) ≤ f2. (9f)
Note that SCED-2b contains four more constraints than ED-
2b – (9e) and (9f) – that reflect the outage of lines e2 and
e1 respectively. By using a procedure similar to that which
we used to derive (7), we can rewrite (9e) and (9f) into the
following compact form:
−f sc ≤ q1 − d1 ≤ f sc, (10)
where
f sc := min{f1, f2}, (11)
is the maximum flow from node 1 to node 2.
We now proceed to analyze the price of security. Recall
that this is defined as the largest ratio between the optimal
values of SCED-2b and ED-2b. Without loss of generality,
we assume for the rest of this section that α1 ≤ α2, i.e. the
generation cost at node 1 is cheaper than that at node 2. We
also refer to the generator at node 1 as the cheap generator
and the generator at node 2 as the expensive generator.
A. Impact of Generation Capacities
The following lemma highlights the impact of cheap
generation availability on the price of security.
Lemma 1: Let ω = (q,d) and ω′ = (q′,d) be two input
instances with identical demand profiles d. If q′1 ≤ q1, then
PoS(ω′) ≤ PoS(ω).
To investigate Lemma 1, let us consider the case where
q′1 ≤ d1 + d2 ≤ q1, which implies that the total demand
d1+d2 can be fully served by the cheap generator in instance
ω, but cannot be fully served by the cheap generator in
instance ω′. Lemma 1 implies that, keeping all other factors
constant, the price of security is greater when the cheap
generation is not limited (i.e. q1 ≥ d1 + d2) versus when
cheap generation is limited (i.e. q′1 ≤ d1+d2). Therefore, the
price of security is higher when there is greater availability
of cheap generation. This is, perhaps, expected since more
cheap generation is substituted for expensive generation in
order to ensure security.
Since we are interested in identifying the instances with
the worst-case price of security, for the rest of our analyses,
we focus on cases in which the capacity of cheap generation
is greater than or equal to the total demand.
B. Impact of Demands
Next, we focus on the impact of the demand profile on
the price of security. Let ω = (q,d) be an instance such
that q1 ≥ d1 + d2, i.e. all demand can be served by cheap
generation. We proceed to calculate the optimal solutions of
ED-2b and EDSC-2b as well as closed-form expressions
for c?ed(ω) and c
?
sc(ω).
First, we compute c?ed(ω). Recall that f
ed defined in (8)
can be interpreted as the maximum flow from node 1 (with
cheap generation) to node 2 (with expensive generation).
Note that there is sufficient cheap generation to serve all
demand. Therefore, the optimal solution of ED-2b is to serve
the demand d1 at node 1 locally using cheap generation,
use as much of the cheap generation as possible to serve
the demand d2 at node 2, i.e. min{d2, fed}, and serve
the remaining demand at node 2 locally using expensive
generation, i.e. [d2−fed]+, where [·]+ denotes the projection
onto the nonnegative orthant. It follows that the optimal cost
of the economic dispatch problem is given by:
c?ed(ω) = α1(d1 + min{fed, d2}) + α2[d2 − fed]+. (12)
Next, we compute c?sc(ω). Similarly, recall that f
sc defined
in (11) can be interpreted as the maximum flow from node
1 to node 2. Therefore, the optimal cost of the security-
constrained economic dispatch problem is given by:
c?sc(ω) = α1(d1 + min{f sc, d2}) + α2[d2 − f sc]+. (13)
It follows that the price of security for instance ω defined
in (4) is given by:
PoS(ω) =
α1(d1 + min{f sc, d2}) + α2[d2 − f sc]+
α1(d1 + min{fed, d2}) + α2[d2 − fed]+ . (14)
Observe that PoS(ω) is small in both low and high load
regimes. This is intuitive. In the low load regime, i.e. when
d1 + d2  fed, the line limits are not saturated. Therefore,
security to outages of any single line is unlikely to increase
the dispatch cost significantly. From the definitions in (8)
and (11), note that fed ≤ 2f sc. In the high load regime,
i.e. d1 + d2  fed, the expensive generator contributes
substantially towards satisfying demand even in ED. Hence,
security to outages of any single line has a small impact on
the dispatch cost, since in both (12) and (13), the second
terms are dominant.
The next lemma highlights the impact of cheap demand
on the price of security.
Lemma 2: Let ω = (q,d) and ω′ = (q,d′) be two input
instances such that q1 ≥ d1 + d2 and d2 = d′2. If d′1 ≥ d1,
then PoS(ω′) ≤ PoS(ω).
Lemma 2 implies that, given a fixed demand at the
expensive node, the price of security is greatest when there
is no demand at the cheap node. This is, perhaps, expected
since there is no additional cost to ensure security when
demand is being served locally (which is the case with
demand located at the cheap node). However, Lemma 2 does
not specify which distributions of demand (over the two
nodes) lead to the greatest price of security. We characterize
the latter in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Fix the total demand d and assume
that q1 ≥ d1 + d2 = d. Then, the demand distribution
d = (d1 = d− d2, d2 = min{d, fed}) yields the maximum
price of security, whose value is given by:
PoS(ω) =
α1(d1 + min{f sc, d2}) + α2[d2 − f sc]+
α1d
. (15)
Lemma 3 states that, given fixed total demand, the price
of security is largest when demand is distributed to the
expensive node, but only until the total demand is up to
fed. When total demand increases beyond fed, having more
demand distributed on the cheap node can, in fact, increase
the price of security. This is intuitive because, when the
transmission lines are fully utilized, additional demand on
either cheap or expensive sides does not change the cost
of security. The reason is that when the transmission lines
are fully utilized, the additional demand on either sides
must be fulfilled locally. In this way, when more demand
is distributed on the cheap node, the optimum economic
dispatch cost is smaller than the case that the demand is
distributed on the expensive node, hence the cost of security
has a relatively bigger impact on the dispatch cost.
Finally, the following theorem is a direct consequence of
the results in lemmas 1, 2, and 3, and characterizes the worst-
case price of security as defined in (5).
Theorem 1: For the 2-bus topology, PoS(ω) achieves its
maximum value when d1 = 0, d2 = fed, and q1 ≥ fed.
Moreover, the maximum value is given by:
PoS =
α2
α1
− (α2 − α1)f
sc
α1fed
. (16)
Theorem 1 states that the instance with the greatest price
of security is such that all demand is at the expensive node
and that demand is equal to the maximum flow from the
cheap node to the expensive node in the economic dispatch
problem. From the definitions in (8) and (11), it follows that
f sc/fed ≤ 1. Observe that, as f sc/fed ↑ 1, the PoS ↓ 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the numerical results. We verify
the analytical results for the 2-bus topology. Also we inves-
tigate the validity of results for the PJM 5-bus topology.
$15
 210MW
$20
 600MW
$40
 200MW
$30
 300MW
1
2
3 4
5
300 300
400
240MW
400MW
150MW
$30
 520MW
Generation Side Load Side
Fig. 2. PJM 5-bus topology, the modifications as compared to the original
version are highlighted in blue.
A. Experimental Setting and Testbeds
We report our results for the simple 2-bus topology [11]
and the PJM 5-bus topology [17]. For 2-bus case, we set
α1 = 1, α2 = 2, f1 = f2 = 100, B1 = B2 = 1. In this way,
we get fed = 200 and f sc = 100. As depicted in Fig. 2, the
PJM 5-bus system is a tractable one in which the system
is roughly divided into two regions: generation side and
demand side. In generation side there are two generators at
buses 1 and 2 with linear costs with α1 = 15 and α2 =
20, which are generally cheaper than the generators at the
demand side.3 We modify the test case in two ways: (i) the
line limit of line (1, 5) is set to 150MW; to make the test case
more realistic in which each line comes with a maximum
limit; and (ii) a generator is added at bus 3; to ensure that the
security-constrained problem is always feasible; by adding
this generator the demand could be always fulfilled using
local generations, regardless of line outage.
B. Impact of Generation Capacity
In this experiment, we verify the claim in Lemma 1 using
2-bus topology in Fig. 3(a) and PJM 5-bus in Fig. 3(b). In
Fig. 3(a), while the demand is fixed (d1 = 0, d2 = 200), we
change the generation capacity at generator 1 from 50% of
demand (q1 = 100) to 150% of the demand (q1 = 300). As
stated in Lemma 1, the price of security increases with the
increase in generation capacity until the capacity reaches the
total demand at 200MW, and stays constant afterwards.
In Fig. 3(b), the result of same experiment for PJM 5-
bus topology is reported. In this experiment, we change the
generation capacity of cheap generators (at buses 1 and 2)
in [0.6, 1.5] of total demand with step 0.05. We note that
even with fixed aggregate demand, the price of security
changes with different demand distributions at nodes. Hence,
we report the maximum and the average price of security
of 500 random runs each of which with different randomly
generated demand profile on the expensive buses with fixed
aggregate load. The result exhibits the same behavior as
in 2-bus topology and as the generation capacity increases
the price of security increases. In summary, the results in
Fig. 3 verify the analysis in Lemma 1, which intuitively
3Note that in original PJM 5-bus system there are two generators at bus
1. In our model, we assume that at each bus there is one generator. Hence,
we modify the system and consider one generator at bus 1 with capacity
equal to the aggregate capacity of the generators at bus 1 in original version.
says that when the generation capacity is not the bottleneck,
higher price of security is expected. Given the result in the
this section, in the rest of the experiments, we relax the
generation capacity of all generators in both topologies.
C. Impact of Demand Profile
In this set of experiments, we verify the analytical results
in lemmas 2, 3 and Theorem 1.
1) Price of Security in the Entire State Space: First, we
focus on 2-bus case and in Fig. 4, we report the price of
security for the entire state space of demand distribution in
cheap and expensive nodes. The most important observation
is that the price of security is globally maximized when d1 =
0 and d2 = fed = 200MW, which is consistent with the
result in Theorem 1. Another observation in Fig. 4(a) is that
given fixed demand at expensive side, the price of security
achieves its maximum when d1 = 0, which is consequence
of Lemma 2. For better illustration, in Fig. 4(b), the price of
security as a function of d2 and for d1 = 0 is reported.
2) Investigating the Result in Lemma 2: In Fig. 5, we
investigate the result in Lemma 2, which says that given a
fixed demand at the expensive node, the price of security de-
creases as the demand at the cheap node increases. For both
topologies, we fix the (aggregate) demand at the expensive
side and change the demand at cheap side. As shown in
Fig. 5(a), as the demand at cheap node 1 increases, the price
of security decreases. In Fig. 5(b), the aggregate demand
in expensive nodes is fixed and equal to 400MW and the
aggregate load at two nodes 1 and 2 is changed from 20
to 400MW with step 20 and at each point the average and
maximum price of security of 500 random runs are reported.
The result clearly demonstrates that as the load at cheap
nodes increases, the price of security decreases and when
there is no demand at cheap nodes the maximum price of
security is attained.
3) Investigating the Result in Lemma 3: Next in Fig. 6, we
investigate the statement in Lemma 3. Toward this, we fix the
aggregate demand and change the distribution of demand at
cheap and expensive nodes. In Fig. 6(a), we report the price
of security, for 3 different values of aggregate demand in
2-bus topology. The result demonstrates that in all cases the
price of security is maximized when the demand d2 at the
expensive node is equal to the maximum line capacity and
the rest is at the cheap node, which is the result shown in
Lemma 3. In Fig. 6(b), the result of the same experiment
for PJM 5-bus topology is reported. In this experiment,
we fix the total demand at d = 1000MW and change the
distribution of load at two regions. The result shows the
same general behavior with 2-bus topology in the sense that
the price of security reaches its maximum when roughly the
demand at expensive node reaches the effective transmission
capacity. However, different from explicit characterization
of the maximum flow capacity in 2-bus topology in (8)
and (11), the effective transmission capacity in PJM 5-bus
topology is not straightforward to recognize. Furthermore,
different peak values for the maximum and the average price
of security imply that even with fixed aggregate demand
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Fig. 3. Price of security with fixed demand distribution and different
generation capacities
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Fig. 4. Price of security for 2-bus network in entire state space of demand
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Fig. 5. Price of security with fixed expensive demand and different cheap
demands
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Fig. 6. Price of security with fixed aggregate demand and different demand
distribution
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Fig. 7. Results of PJM 5-bus network with different values of demand
at expensive side, price of security changes with different
demand distribution.
4) Insights for the Characterizing the Price of Security
in General Networks: Finally, we proceed to investigate the
price of security for PJM 5-bus topology in more details
in the worst-case scenario similar to Fig. 4(b) for 2-bus
topology, in which the demand at cheap side is zero. The
first result for PJM 5-bus topology is shown in Fig. 7(a). The
notable observation is that the overall behavior is similar to
the 2-bus topology, since the price of security is 1 at low load
regimes when d ≤ 200. Then, there is an increasing region
(from 200 to ≈ 400) in which the price of security increases
with the increase of demand at expensive side, and eventually
it achieves the maximum and then (when d ≥ 400) the price
of security is decreasing.
The result, however, is different from 2-bus topology in
a way that the critical points (the point at which the price
begins to increase, and the one at which the price takes it
maximum) are not straightforward function of line properties.
Recall that these points are characterized explicitly in (8)
and (11) for 2-bus topology. Fig. 7(a) shows that in worst-
case, the aggregate demand is less than aggregate line limit
from the cheap side to expensive side that is 790MW. Thus,
this result shows that characterizing the worst case demand
profile is more challenging in PJM 5-bus topology.
To investigate how network topology and line character-
istics can impact the two aforementioned critical points of
the price of security, in three consecutive steps, we simplify
PJM 5-bus topology to be similar to 2-bus case. Toward
this, we first remove the line (1, 5) with capacity 150MW
(reported in Fig. 7(b)), second, we normalized the link
capacities such that f(1,3)/B(1,3) = f(2,5)/B(2,5) (reported
in Fig. 7(c)); recall that fed in 2-bus topology is maximized
when f1/B1 = f2/B2; third, we set the homogeneous gen-
erator costs at $15 at generation side and $40 at demand side
(reported in Fig. 7(d)).
The observations are as follows: (i) price of security at
the second critical point where the price of security reaches
its maximum, increases as the network topology simplifies
(1.47→ 1.53→ 1.55→ 1.75); (ii) the aggregate demand at
which the first critical point occurs, i.e, the point where the
price of security starts to increase, increases as the networks
simplifies (200MW → 300 → 350 → 350); and finally,
the aggregate demand at which the the price of security
maximizes also increases (400MW → 600 → 700 → 750).
These observations demonstrate that the worst-case aggregate
demand that leads to maximum price of security depends on
several characteristics of topology, transmission lines, and
cost functions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we tackle a novel and important problem on
understanding the economic cost of incorporating security
constraints in economic dispatch. We introduce the notion of
price of security as a metric that formally characterizes the
economic inefficiency of ensuring N − 1 security. Focusing
on security to line outages in a 2-bus-2-line topology, we
investigate the impact of generation availability and demand
distribution on the price of security. In addition, we show
that the price of security is greatest when the entire demand
is equal to the maximum flow of the lines and is placed at the
expensive side of the network. Extensive experimental results
on the PJM 5-bus system show that some of our theoretical
observations manifest in more general settings.
As future work, we plan to extend our theoretical results
to more general networks. The starting point, perhaps, is to
consider a network that can be divided into two regions, one
cheap and one expensive. Our theoretical results indicate that
the price of security may depend critically on the maximum
flow from the cheap to the expensive region. Therefore, the
challenge is to characterize the maximum flow. Our exper-
iments demonstrate that the price of security also depends
significantly on the topology within the regions, demand
distributions, and line characteristics. Another direction is to
study the price of security for corrective security-constrained
economic dispatch and contrast the latter with preventive
approaches to understand the tradeoffs between operating
costs and security benefits.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We consider two cases.
Case 1: Constraint (6a) is not active in the optimal solution
of instance ω′ in ED-2b, i.e., q
′?
1 < q
′
1, where q
′?
1 is the
optimal output of generator 1 in ED-2b. This means that
even though the capacity of generator 1 is limited in instance
ω′, i.e., q′1 ≤ d, the other constraints in (6c), (6d), and (6e)
hinder the generation of generator 1 at full capacity. Con-
sequently, the generation capacity of cheap generator is not
a bottleneck in problem, thereby increasing it in instance ω
would not change the optimal value and solution of ED-2b,
i.e., c?ed(ω) = c
?
ed(ω
′). Similarly, we have c?sc(ω) = c
?
sc(ω
′),
since the constraint set of SCED-2b is more restricted than
the set of ED-2b, and if (6a) is not active in ED-2b, the
equivalent constraint (9a) in SCED-2b is not active as well.
Putting together, we have PoS(ω) = PoS(ω′).
Case 2: Constraint (6a) is active in the optimal solution
of instance ω′ in the ED-2b, i.e., q
′?
1 = q
′
1. In this case, we
prove PoS(ω′) ≤ PoS(ω).
To prove, we write the optimal cost of instance ω′ as a
function of optimal cost of instance ω in both original and
security constrained problems. We have the following costs
for instance ω:
c?ed(ω) = α1q
?
1 + α2(d− q?1), (17)
c?sc(ω) = α1(q
?
1 − a) + α2(d− q?1 + a), (18)
where q?1 is the optimal output of generator 1 and d = d1+d2
and a ≥ 0 is the amount of reduction in generation output
of generator 1 due to respecting the security constraints in
instance ω.
On the other hand in instance ω′, we have q
′?
1 = q
′
1, so
we get the following cost c?ed(ω):
c?ed(ω
′) = α1q′1 + α2(d− q′1)
= α1(q
?
1 − (q?1 − q′1)) + α2(d− q?1 + q?1 − q′1)
= α1q
?
1 + α2(d− q?1) + (α2 − α1)(q?1 − q′1)
= c?ed(ω) +A, (19)
where A = (α2 − α1)(q?1 − q′1). Note that A ≥ 0 since
α2 ≥ α1 and q?1 ≥ q′1. Similarly, we have
c?sc(ω
′) = α1(q′1 − b) + α2(d− q′1 + b)
= α1(q
?
1 − (q?1 − q′1)− b)
+α2(d− q?1 + q?1 − q′1 + b)
= α1(q
?
1 − a) + α2(d− q?1 + a)
+(α2 − α1)(q?1 − q′1 + b− a)
= c?sc(ω) +A+B, (20)
where b ≥ 0 is the amount of reduction in generation
output of generator 1 due to respecting security constraints
in instance ω′ and B = (α2 − α1)(b − a). We note that
B ≤ 0 since α2 ≥ 0 and b ≤ a. Note that b could be at most
a which is the amount of reduction in output of generator 1
to respect security constraints. Now we proceed to calculate
the price of security for input instance ω′ as follows
PoS(ω′) =
c?sc(ω
′)
c?ed(ω
′)
=
c?sc(ω) +A+B
c?ed(ω) +A
≤ c
?
sc(ω)
c?ed(ω)
= PoS(ω),
where the inequality follows from xy ≥ x+zy+z , if x ≥ y and
z ≥ 0. Putting together both cases the result is proven.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We claim that c?ed(ω
′) = c?ed(ω)+α1(d
′
1−d1). The reason
is that the increase in demand, i.e., (d′1 − d1), is in the side
of cheap node, so it can be locally satisfied by the cheap
generator at node 1 with the minimum cost of α1(d′1 − d1).
Similarly, we get c?sc(ω
′) = c?sc(ω) + α1(d
′
1 − d1), since the
additional security constraints do not impact on the ability
of local generation. Now, we have
PoS(ω′) =
c?sc(ω
′)
c?ed(ω
′)
=
c?sc(ω) + α1(d
′
1 − d1)
c?ed(ω) + α1(d
′
1 − d1)
≤ c
?
sc(ω)
c?ed(ω)
= PoS(ω),
where the last steps follows again from xy ≥ x+zy+z when x ≥ y
and z ≥ 0.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Given fixed d = d1 +d2, our goal is to find the maximum
value of (14). Since the equation of price of security is
piecewise smooth, we proceed to find the maximum values
in each piece separately.
Case 1: d ≤ f sc ≤ fed: in this case regardless of
how the demand is distributed at nodes 1 and 2, we have
c?ed(ω) = c
?
sc(ω) = α1d, hence PoS(ω) = 1.
Case 2: f sc ≤ d ≤ fed: in
this case we have c?ed(ω) = α1d, and
c?sc(ω) = α1(d− d2 + f sc) + α2(d2 − f sc) hence
PoS(ω) =
α1(d− d2 + f sc) + α2(d2 − f sc)
α1d
.
By taking the derivative we get
∂PoS(ω)
∂d2
= α2 − α1 > 0,
hence PoS(ω) is strictly increasing function and takes its
maximum when d2 = d = min{d, fed}.
Case 3: f sc ≤ fed ≤ d: we claim that
ω =
(
q = {q1 ≥ d, q2},d = (d− fed, fed})
)
maximizes
the price of security. In this case we have
c?ed(ω) = α1d,
and
c?sc(ω) = α1(d− fed + f sc) + α2(fed − f sc).
Now, we prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that there
is an instance ω′ where PoS(ω′) > PoS(ω). Given the state
space, ω′ must be in one of the following forms:
ω′ =
(
q = {q1 ≥ d, q2},d = (d− fed + , fed − })
)
(21)
ω′ =
(
q = {q1 ≥ d, q2},d = (d− fed − , fed + })
)
. (22)
We first compare the price of security of instance in (21).
We have
c?ed(ω
′) = α1d = c?ed(ω),
and
c?sc(ω
′) = α1(d− fed + + f sc) + α2(fed − − f sc)
= c?sc(ω)− (α2 − α1) < c?sc(ω)
Apparently, we have PoS(ω′)<PoS(ω), which is contradic-
tion. Similarly, we compare the price of security of instance
in (22), with the original instance ω. We have
c?ed(ω
′) = α1(d− ) + α2
= c?ed(ω) + (α2 − α1) > c?sc(ω)
and
c?sc(ω
′) = α1(d− fed − + f sc) + α2(fed + − f sc)
= c?sc(ω) + (α2 − α1) > c?sc(ω)
Hence for the price of security we get
PoS(ω′) =
c?sc(ω
′)
c?ed(ω
′)
=
c?sc(ω) + (α2 − α1)
c?ed(ω) + (α2 − α1)
<
c?sc(ω)
c?ed(ω)
= PoS(ω),
which is again a contrary. Hence the proof is completed.
